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Abstract
We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other
asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made
prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding process earlier entrants can make bids before
later entrants choose whether to compete. The sequential process is more e¢ cient because
entrants base their decisions on superior information. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus
from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry in several ways it
usually generates higher expected revenue.
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A large body of both academic and practitioner opinion argues that sellers bene￿t from the
simultaneous competition of an auction. The United States legal system strongly encourages
boards of directors that receive a serious takeover o⁄er to hold auctions as the way to
maximize shareholder value.1 Still, many assets ranging from private companies to most
real estate are sold through sequential processes in which sellers use the threat of refusing
an o⁄er and waiting for more competitors as their weapon for negotiating a price. Many
attractive, sophisticated buyers ranging from Warren Bu⁄et to private equity ￿rms to large
petrochemical companies say they avoid auctions because the risk of expending costly e⁄ort
for no return is too large.2
Participating in a sales process is generally costly, and a sequential search process econ-
omizes on those costs. If there are enough potential buyers and the seller is able to ￿rmly
commit at any time to its optimal minimum price then the seller can capture the gains from
sequential entry.3 But in markets such as that for corporate takeovers, it is generally the
buyers who name prices, and a buyer may make a pre-emptive o⁄er which can deter poten-
tial rivals from entering. Where such public pre-emptive bids are credible, their existence or
absence conveys information which makes subsequent entry decisions more e¢ cient, attract-
ing additional bidders when the early ones turn out to be weak.4 The issue for sellers who
1See, for example, Cramton and Schwartz (1991).
2Bu⁄et states each year in his annual report under ￿Acquisition Criteria￿ : ￿[W]e don￿ t want to waste
our time ...We don￿ t participate in auctions.￿The italics are in the original.
Similarly, a managing director of a private equity fund says: ￿If ...I know it￿ s a broad auction, even if it￿ s
a very nice business, ...I still may not take it ...seriously because [the] chances of winning are so slim. I just
don￿ t put the e⁄ort into it.￿Mergers and Acquisitions, ￿Surviving M&A Auction Rigors￿ , December 2006,
p.32.
3For example, see Riley and Zeckhauser (1983), and Milgrom (2004) who show that given an in￿nite
stream of potential buyers with independent and identically distributed values from a known distribution
a seller can achieve full e¢ ciency and extract all expected surplus if it can commit to a ￿rm posted price.
McAfee and McMillan (1987) considered the case where, as in our auction model, costly entry is fully
determined before any credible bids are made. In their model a seller who could choose an optimal entry
fee could also extract all expected surplus. However, this mechanism would generate less revenue than
an optimal posted price if there are enough potential bidders. On optimal mechanisms see, for example,
Cremer, Spiegel, and Zheng (2006), Kjerstad and Vagstad (2000), McAfee and McMillan (1988), Menezes
and Monteiro (2000), and the references therein. See Krishna (2002), Milgrom (2004), Menezes and Monteiro
(2005), and Klemperer (2004) for syntheses of a large fraction of the auction literature.
4Fishman (1988) considered a model with two potential bidders, both of whom would have participated
in an auction. In this case, a pre-emptive o⁄er could deter entry by the second bidder but a sequential
mechanism would not increase the number of bidders.
In addition to Fishman￿ s pioneering paper, see also Hirshleifer and Png (1989) and Daniel and Hirshleifer
(1998). These papers began the literature on jump bidding - see Avery (1998), Rothkopf and Harstad (1994),
and Fujishima, McAdams, and Shoham (1999) for alternative discussions. Among the large theoretical
1can choose between simultaneous and sequential entry is whether the e¢ ciencies generated
by a sequential process are enough to o⁄set the expected gains to buyers from preemptive
bidding. That is, should a seller structure the sale process (for example, by timing the
release of critical information) so that bidders are unable or unwilling to make early bids?
Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show under mild conditions that even a simple ascending
auction with no reserve price, is more pro￿table than the best possible process that can be
conducted with one fewer bidder. But with entry costs even if, as we will show, sequential
mechanisms attract fewer bidders in expectation, they may attract more bidders when those
bidders are most valuable. So is a simple auction still desirable?
This paper compares the two most commonly used and studied bidding processes in
which entry is costly and the seller has limited power or information. In both processes,
an unknown number of potential bidders make entry decisions sequentially, before learning
their values. In an auction, no credible bidding is possible until all entry decisions have
been taken. In a sequential mechanism, potential bidders arrive in turn. Each one observes
the current price and bidding history and decides whether to pay the entry cost to learn its
value. If it does, and if it succeeds in outbidding any current incumbent (who can respond
by raising its own bid), it can also make any additional jump bid it wishes to attempt to
deter further entry. In both bidding processes, we assume the seller does not have the power
or credibility to commit to a take-it-or-leave-it minimum (reservation) price above a buyer￿ s
minimum possible value.
Our central result is that the straightforward, level-playing-￿eld competition that an
auction creates is usually more pro￿table for a seller than a sequential process, even though
the sequential mechanism is more e¢ cient (as measured by the winner￿ s expected value less
expected aggregate entry costs) because it is more informative.
We identify four factors that may cause the expected revenue between the auction and
the sequential mechanism to di⁄er. The ￿rst three all unambiguously favor the auction. Two
of these factors are fairly straightforward. First, even in the most favorable circumstances,
a sequential process could only be superior if the queue of potential bidders is su¢ ciently
longer than the number that would compete in an auction. Second, in a sequential mech-
anism bidders who deter entry choose a price where the expected distribution of winning
values is such that an additional entrant would expect to earn zero. By contrast, except in a
literature on endogenous entry into auctions, see Burguet and Sakovics (1996), Harstad (1990, 2003), McAfee
and McMillan (1987), Menezes and Monteiro (2000), and the references therein.
2knife-edge break-even case, bidders deterred from an auction face a distribution of winning
values that make entry strictly unpro￿table.
These two factors would be nulli￿ed with an in￿nite stream of potential bidders, and
when parameters are such that the expected pro￿ts of the marginal bidder who does not
enter the auction is exactly zero. The third factor is therefore crucial: because the value of
the winning bidder is generally less dispersed in the sequential process, which is more likely
to attract one high-value bidder but will never attract more than one, the expected value
of the top bidder in the auction must be higher to deter entry, because dispersion makes
the entrant￿ s option to buy more valuable ￿this is just the standard consumer-theory result
that consumers prefer more random prices.5
These three factors all speak to the general superiority of the auction in generating
entry, and each factor provides a separate reason why the expected value of the winner in
the auction must exceed the expected value of the winner in the sequential mechanism. But
the seller ultimately cares about the expected price paid, and the comparison of expected
prices is a somewhat di⁄erent question. The fourth factor, then, involves the gap between
expected winning values and expected revenues, and this can work either for or against
auctions.
However, we show that for typical demand speci￿cations a higher expected winner￿ s
value directly implies higher expected revenue. Furthermore, this fourth factor, like the
third, depends upon the dispersion of winners￿values being di⁄erent in the two mechanisms.
For the fourth factor to be important, the dispersion must be much greater in the auction
than in the sequential mechanism, which in turn makes the third factor more signi￿cant. So
even when the remaining two factors are unimportant, it is hard for the simple sequential
mechanism to defeat the auction in raising expected revenue.
Part of the appeal of the auction is that the competition it creates allows the seller to
do well independent of any knowledge of bidder values or any ability to exploit that knowl-
edge. Arming either buyers or sellers with greater commitment power and the knowledge
necessary to use it will modify the equilibrium in the sequential mechanism. If the seller
can opportunistically subsidize entry it can increase expected revenue ￿mainly through the
5Put di⁄erently, a potential bidder is just like an investor considering the purchase of a stock-option,
with the bidder￿ s entry cost corresponding to the price of the option, so ceteris paribus the mechanism with
the more uncertain price is more attractive ￿just as a stock option is more valuable the more volatile is the
stock.
3threat to subsidize.6 The seller￿ s ability to subsidise future bidders both prompts stronger
types of current bidders to make higher deterring o⁄ers, and prevents some weaker types
from deterring ￿so in many cases subsidies never actually need to be paid. But the sequen-
tial mechanism with subsidies can only be more pro￿table than an auction when the seller
both has su¢ cient information and power to set the subsidies optimally and has enough
potential bidders. And if a sequential buyer can make plausible threats to withdraw if a
seller seeks additional bids then the advantage of the auction becomes larger.
In sum, the auction looks better than practical versions of the sequential mechanism on
the revenue criterion.
Moreover, while the model suggests the sequential mechanism is more e¢ cient than the
auction, this may re￿ ect the model￿ s narrow view of e¢ ciency. First, because the sequential
mechanism gives more surplus to the earliest bidders, potential entrants may dissipate their
surplus in a race to the front of the queue. In this case, net social surplus will equal seller
revenue. And second, even if bidders￿rents are not dissipated in this way, mechanisms
that give sellers a greater share of the value of the asset sold provide greater incentives to
create valuable assets. So since the auction usually raises more revenue, it may well be more
socially e¢ cient overall.
Our results are consistent with the observation that sellers of companies and other assets
often try to run auctions, while buyers commonly try to avoid them. Indeed, in one recent
poll of private equity ￿rms approximately 90 percent said that they did not like to participate
in auctions or buy businesses in auctions. Almost the same majority said that when acting
as sellers they prefer an auction process.7 While it is possible to design examples where
bidders will prefer auctions, it will typically be in the interest of an early bidder to pre-empt
the process if possible.
We begin (in section 2) with a model of a random number of symmetric risk-neutral
potential bidders with search costs of ￿nding out their private values of, for example, a
company for sale.8 We show (section 3) that auctions are less e¢ cient but likely to raise
6If entry can both be subsidized and taxed without limit it is possible to have a fully e¢ cient mechanism
that extracts all surplus, regardless of the number of potential bidders.
7￿Auction Process Roundtable￿ , Mergers and Acquisitions, December 2006, pp. 31-32. Our model
ignores any technological costs of choosing one selling mechanism over another (see e.g., Arnold and Lippman
(1995), and Wang (1993, 1995, 1998)) or legal issues (see e.g., Cramton and Schwartz (1991), Gilson and
Black (1995)). Nor do we discuss seller credibility, see, e.g. Lopomo (2000), McAdams and Schwarz (2007).
8Our basic model assumes bidders enter any auction sequentially (so the maximum number that enters is
deterministic). However, we will show our results are essentially una⁄ected if we instead assume simultaneous
entry into the auction by many potential bidders following mixed entry strategies as, for example, in Levin
4more revenue than sequential bidding, and explain why. In section 4 we consider how bidding
subsidies and other simple tactics such as lock-ups, break-up fees, and matching rights may
be used by sellers to improve their expected revenue from the sequential mechanism. We
also illustrate how increased commitment power on the part of buyers can reduce revenue.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We compare two methods of selling an asset for which there is a queue of risk-neutral
potential buyers. The probability that at least j potential bidders exist, given the existence
of at least j ￿ 1, is ￿j, 0 ￿ ￿j ￿ 1: We write f￿jg1
j=1 for ￿1;￿2;￿3;::: . Each buyer decides
in turn whether or not to pay a cost c to learn its own private value, which is drawn
independently from the distribution F(v) with a continuous density f(v); F(v) = 0 and
F(v) = 1; v equals the seller￿ s value,9 and v 6 1: All this is common knowledge among the
buyers (the seller needs no knowledge of F(￿); c; or f￿jg1
j=1).
In the Auction mechanism, players cannot make any credible bid commitments until
after entry stops. So when potential buyers make their entry decisions they observe only
how many bidders have entered thus far.10 When entry has stopped, there is a standard
English auction in which the bidder with the highest value wins and pays the value of the
second highest.11
Our Sequential mechanism is one that is commonly assumed for the sale of a company
(see, e.g., Fishman (1988)). The ￿rst bidder simply chooses an initial bid. Any subsequent
entrant may enter an English auction with the incumbent high bidder, and the winner of
that competition may then, if it wishes, make a jump bid before ￿nding out whether any
subsequent potential entrant(s) actually exist. We will see later that neither the seller￿ s, nor
the bidders￿ , expected surpluses ￿and therefore also none of the important results ￿would
be a⁄ected if jump bidding were also permitted prior to, or during, the competition between
and Smith (1994).
9The assumption that v equals the seller￿ s value is not required for any of our Propositions, but simpli￿es
the discussion in section 3.5.
10They do not know whether any subsequent potential entrant(s) actually exist, but this makes no dif-
ference to the important results - see note 23. Our results are also essentially una⁄ected if we assume
simultaneous entry into the auction by many potential bidders following mixed entry strategies - see section
3.5.
11The Revenue Equivalence Theorem implies our results hold for any standard auction. See Myerson
(1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981).
5the current incumbent and current entrant. Nor would it make any di⁄erence if the actual
number of potential entrants was revealed in advance of the game, or at any point during
the game.12
Bidders cannot lower bids that they have already made. Potential entrants observe all
previous bids at the time they make their entry decisions, and when entry stops the current
high bidder wins the asset at its bid.
We consider the perfect Nash equilibrium of the auction, which is unique except for
knife-edge cases with two equilibria when the last bidder is indi⁄erent to entering; in this
case we take the worse case (the last bidder does not enter) for the auction.13
We also consider all the perfect Nash equilibria of the sequential mechanism in which
any buyer with a value greater than or equal to some constant cuto⁄value v* makes a high
enough preemptive bid that all subsequent entry is deterred.14 However, we focus most
attention on the unique perfect sequential equilibrium (as is standard in contexts like this
one ￿see below).15 We refer to this equilibrium deterrring value of the Sequential mechanism
as VS:16 We will refer to the minimum value that a bidder would need to have to deter if its
value were Known by potential entrants as VK.
To avoid trivialities, we assume there is at least one potential bidder and maybe more
(￿1 = 1 and ￿2 > 0); and that at least two bidders would be attracted into an auction if they
exist.17 The seller can demand a minimum price of v in both mechanisms but no higher.
There is no discounting.
12See note 23.
13This assumption, which is anyway irrelevant for almost all values of the parameters, a⁄ects none of the
results, but saves tedious discussion.
14We will note later that there are other equilibria that are not (perfect) ￿symmetric cuto⁄￿equilibria,
but they do not seem very plausible.
15In a perfect sequential equilibrium, no bidder wishes to deviate from the equilibrium if a potential
entrant who observes an out-of-equilibrium price would assume, if possible, that the bidder￿ s type is among
some set K (a subset of [v;v]) such that (i) all types in K would bene￿t from the deviation if it was then
inferred that the bidder￿ s type was in K, and (ii) all types not in K would prefer not to deviate given the
aforementioned inference.
This re￿nement is also variously called ￿credible￿or ￿neologism-proof￿or ￿F-G-P￿after its developers
(Grossman and Perry (1986) and Farrell (1993)) ￿though Farrell￿ s de￿nition is very slightly di⁄erent, this
is unimportant here; see also Fudenberg and Tirole￿ s (1991) standard text. Technically, we use the natural
extension of the re￿nement to in￿nite strategy spaces; also a bit more than perfect sequential is needed to
select a unique equilibrium when ￿j = 1 8j; and in that case we just use the limit of the (unique) perfect
sequential equilibria as ￿j ! 1 8j (this is also the unique equilibrium that Farrell￿ s de￿nition chooses
8f￿jg1
j=1, because he requires all types in K would strictly bene￿t in part (i) above).
16This will also turn out to be the revenue - or V alue to the Seller - from running the sequential mechanism
in the important special case ￿j = 1 8j in this equilibrium.
17If either no bidder, or only one bidder, would enter the auction, both mechanisms would yield the same
revenue. If ￿j = 0; we de￿ne ￿k ￿ 0 8k > j:
6Notation
We de￿ne the ￿marginal revenue￿ (or ￿virtual utility￿ ) of a type, v, as MR(v) ￿
[v ￿
1￿F(v)
f(v) ].18 We write vi(k) for the actual ith highest value among k bidders, and n*
for the maximum number of entrants into the auction. That is, n* is the largest integer
satisfying
Efv1(n)g￿Efv2(n)g
n > c or, equivalently,
R v
x=v[F n￿1(x) ￿ F n(x)]dx > c: We write
S(v) for the expected surplus of a bidder whose value is drawn randomly from F(￿) and who
competes in an ascending auction against a single bidder whose value is drawn independently
from the same distribution, conditional on the latter bidder￿ s value exceeding v. It is easy
to compute that S(v) =
R v
x=v[1 ￿ F(x)][F(x) ￿ F(v)]=[1 ￿ F(v)]dx.
3 Revenue, E¢ ciency, and Bidders￿Surplus
3.1 Equilibria
The expected revenue from the auction equals the sum of expected revenue conditional
on there being precisely j bidders times the probability that precisely j bidders exist, for
all j 2 f1;2;:::n*￿1g; plus the expected revenue when the maximum possible number of
bidders, n*, enters times the probability that at least n* potential bidders exist. That is:




















In the equilibrium of the sequential mechanism, the ￿rst entrant makes a jump bid that
is high enough to deter subsequent entry if its value exceeds some cuto⁄ value, v*, and
otherwise bids the minimum price v ￿just as Fishman originally showed in his two-bidder
version of this model. Any subsequent entrant whose value exceeds the current high bid
competes with the current incumbent, and the price then rises until the lower-value of these
two bidders quits at the point at which the price reaches its value. If it was the current
incumbent who quit, the new entrant will then jump bid to the higher price that deters
subsequent entry if its value exceeds the cuto⁄ value, v*, but will otherwise not raise the
18Section 3.3 (see especially notes 33 and 35) discusses why it is helpful to analyse auctions using marginal
revenues. We make no assumptions on the MR(v) function.
7price further prior to any further entry.19 (If it was the entrant that quit, there is also no
jump bid prior to further entry, in equilibrium, because the current incumbent￿ s value must
be below v*.) If there is no jump bid, another potential bidder then enters, if one exists.
The deterrence value, v*, cannot be lower than the value VS that satis￿es S(VS) = c,
because if it were, then a prospective entrant would pro￿t from entering against a deterring
bid (because entering and winning against a deterring bid would deter all future entry, and
the gross surplus from competing against a single bidder whose value is known to be v* or
higher is by de￿nition S(v*); and clearly S(v*) > c if v*< VS). But an incumbent with
a type as low as VS can deter entry only if it is pooled with types with higher values ￿if
an incumbent￿ s value was known to be as low as VS; entry against it would be known to
be pro￿table. So while v* = VS is a perfect Nash equilibrium, there are other equilibria in
which higher-value incumbents are separated. The perfect constant-cuto⁄Nash equilibrium
in which the fewest types deter entry is the one in which the only types who deter are those
who would deter if their actual values were known (namely those whose values at least equal
the value VK which satis￿es
R v
x=VK[x￿VK]f(x)dx￿c = 0). In these equilibria a bidder with
value VS ￿nds it too costly to pool with higher-value incumbents, and instead accommodates
entry ￿but, as in Fishman￿ s model, these equilibria are not perfect sequential; see below.20
At any time, the (lowest) bid that deters further entry (i.e., the deterring price at that
time) is such that a bidder with value v* is just indi⁄erent about deviating to accommodating
entry. That is, the bidder with value v* is indi⁄erent between making a deterring bid and
deviating to a strategy of never jump bidding but always bidding the lowest price possible
to beat any challenger until entry closes, or until the price exceeds v*.21
This indi⁄erence condition is exactly as in Fishman￿ s model in which just one bidder
19The timing of the jump bid is unimportant. If the entrant were permitted to jump bid prior to competing
with the current incumbent (or during that competition), it would be indi⁄erent about when it made its
jump. If, for example, it makes its jump before that competition, it bids the expected value of the jump
bid that it would have made after competing with the incumbent (which depends upon the price at which
the current incumbent quits). Seller￿ s revenue, and all bidders￿surpluses, are una⁄ected. See note 23.
20Recall that we refer to the (minimum) deterrring value in the Sequential mechanism as VS, and the
minimum value that would deter if the actual value were Known by potential entrants as VK. Equilibria
with v* even higher than VK are ruled out by our assumption of a constant deterring value, and also fail
not only the intuitive criterion, but also the weaker ￿test of dominated messages￿ , even in any single period
- see proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix. (There is also a plethora of perfect non-constant-cuto⁄ equilibria;
and even non-cuto⁄ equilibria, for example, entry could be deterred only by some particular set of prices
exceeding the price that would correspond to value VS, but these seem particularly implausible.)
21If a bidder with value v* is just indi⁄erent about deviating, a bidder with a lower (higher) value would
strictly gain (lose) by deviating, since higher-value types prefer strategies with higher probabilities of winning
(and deviating strictly reduces the bidder￿ s probability of winning). Not deviating therefore signals a value
￿ v* and so successfully deters entry if v* ￿ VS:
8can deter. However, in our more general model in which many bidders have the possibility
of deterring, the deterring price will generally change over the course of the game, since
it depends on both the value of the previous high bidder, and the sequence of subsequent
￿j￿ s.22 In our model, therefore, the expected revenue calculation would be extremely messy
if done through computing the actual price contingent on any sequence of bidders, but the
calculation is straightforward using the standard result that the expected revenue equals the
expected marginal revenue, MR; of the winning bidder ￿since this only requires knowing
the identity of the winner.23 We illustrate the bidding process and revenue calculations
in examples in the Appendix. Summarizing, we have (see Appendix for the details of the
proof):
Lemma 2: There exists a perfect Nash equilibrium of the Sequential mechanism in which
any buyer with a value greater than or equal to v* makes a bid that deters all subsequent
entry if and only if v*2 [VS;VK]




[x ￿ VK]f(x)dx ￿ c = 0: (3)
The Sequential mechanism￿ s expected revenue


















Note that if ￿j = 1 8j, the expected revenue = v*:
In the unique perfect sequential equilibrium, v* = VS:
Example: If F(v) = v for v 2 [0;1] and ￿ is constant (￿j = ￿ ￿ 1 8j > 1), any new entrant







(> p), after defeating the existing incumbent at price p.24
22For example, if the ￿rst bidder￿ s value is between its deterring price and v*, a second bidder who enters
and defeats the ￿rst will still need to make at least a small jump to credibly signal that its value is at least
v*. (In the special case ￿j = 1 8j the deterring price always equals v* - see next subsection.)
23The original result is due to Myerson (1981). Marginal-revenue analysis (following Bulow and Roberts
(1989) and Bulow and Klemperer (1996)) makes it clear that expected revenues (and every bidder￿ s expected
surplus) would be una⁄ected by bidders knowing the number of potential entrants who actually exist in
advance of bidding (assuming it is common knowledge that they know this), and/or by the timing of
the entrant￿ s jump-bidding (whether it is before, or during, or subsequent to competing with a current
incumbent, or at all of these times) - because although the actual prices would of course depend upon these
assumptions, the identity, and therefore the expected MR, of the winner would not.
24For the ￿rst entrant, p = v (= 0 in the example).









￿2 ln(1 ￿ ￿v*):25 In the unique perfect
sequential equilibrium, v*= VS = 1 ￿
p
6c. (Calculations are in the the Appendix.)
Not surprisingly, the comparison between the sequential mechanism and the auction
depends crucially on which equilibrium is played in the sequential mechanism. However,
only the v*= VS equilibrium is perfect sequential. In other equilibria, bidders with values
above VS could gain from deviating to a bid that signals a value of (just) VS or more if the
potential entrant were then to infer the equilibrium deterring value is actually only VS; and
all other types of bidders would lose from making such a bid however the potential entrant
were to respond;26 so the potential entrant should make such an inference, and a bid that
signals a value of at least VS therefore does deter entry.27
A large literature argues that the perfect sequential equilibrium is the only reasonable
one. Fishman (1988, 1989) restricts attention to this equilibrium in his analysis of the two-
potential-bidders version of our model, arguing that only this one is ￿credible￿ . Many other
authors take the same view, and pay scant attention to alternative equilibria.28 Shleifer and
Vishny, for example, argue ￿The case for the minimum bid equilibrium is compelling....
There is no basis for [any alternative] belief, since it is common knowledge that all types
would like to [pay] the lowest possible price.￿ 29 Bagnoli, Gordon, and Lipman say ￿[We do
not] clutter the text with details [of equilibria that are not perfect sequential].￿Our own view
is that even if this last position may be overly strong, we agree the unique perfect-sequential
equilibrium ￿v*= VS ￿deserves the most attention.30
25The deterring price is increasing in both p and ￿, and equals the deterring value, v*, both in the limit
as p ! v* and in the limit as ￿ ! 1; as ￿ ! 0; the deterring price equals price, p; as ￿ ! 0 and 1; expected
revenue equals 0 and v*, respectively ￿see discussion at end of section 3.2.
26In fact, a perfect sequential equilibrium requires only that all other types would lose from making such
a bid if the potential entrant makes the inference that they are types above VS, so the re￿nement is (even)
more compelling than usual in our context; see notes 15 and 29.
27As throughout the re￿nement literature, it can be debated whether the potential entrant should make
such an inference but, for example, Riley￿ s (2001) recent, authoritative Journal of Economic Literature
survey of the signalling literature makes a strong argument for this (indeed he concludes that if a perfect
sequential equilibrium fails to exist, then there is no credible equilibrium at all).
28For example, Bagnoli and Lipman (1996), Bagnoli, Gordon and Lipman (1989), Shleifer and Vishny
(1986), Bernhardt and Scoones (1993), McCardle and Viswanathan (1994), and Che and Lewis (2006),
among others.
29The Shleifer-Vishny model has some di⁄erent features than ours, but in our model, just as in theirs, ￿in
order to eliminate implausible equilibria, we do not rely on the Grossman-Perry method of treating types in
the complement of K....In the cases we consider, types in the complement of K would not want to deviate
regardless of what [those observing the deviation] believe.￿(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, note 14). See our
note 15 above. See also Gertner, Gibbons, and Scharfstein (1988).
30Other arguments ￿for example, one in the spirit of McLennan￿ s (1985) ￿justi￿able￿equilibrium (if a
10Perhaps the best argument against the v*= VS equilibrium is that the seller prefers the
v*= VK equilibrium, and could perhaps in e⁄ect achieve it by changing the game slightly
to a game that is similar to our game but in which the only reasonable equilibrium is
v*= VK. We therefore discuss this possibility in section 4, but otherwise focus primarily on
the v*= VS equilibrium.
3.2 E¢ ciency
It is a standard result that the amount of entry into a private-value ascending auction
is e¢ cient (see Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993)). So, since in both our mechanisms the last
potential entrant makes its entry decision based on the possibility of having to compete in
an ascending action with the strongest actual entrant, it is straightforward that all the entry
decisions are socially e¢ cient given the available information (details are in the Appendix):
Lemma 3: Conditional on the information available to a potential entrant, it makes the
socially correct decision about whether to enter in either of the sales mechanisms.
Note that in the sequential mechanism the higher is v*; the more e¢ cient is the equi-
librium. A social planner who could observe each bidder￿ s value upon entry would choose
entry until the highest value was such that the expected contribution of a new bidder was
less than or equal to zero, that is, until a bidder was found with a value greater than or
equal to VK, since
R v
x=VK[x ￿ VK]f(x)dx ￿ c = 0. So the VK equilibrium is socially optimal.
In other equilibria, entrants who ￿nd out their values are in the range [v*;VK) pool with
those above VK and ine¢ ciently prevent the further entry that would occur if their values
were publicly observed. However, all these equilibria are more e¢ cient than the auction,
because they all provide prospective bidders with better information than the auction does.
(A sequential bidder who learned whether there were zero or one incumbent bidders with
values in excess of v* would never revise its entry decision based upon the number of previous
entrants; a bidder who knew the number of other entrants might revise its decision upon
learning whether or not there was a bidder with a value of more than v*.) Therefore, since
all the entry decisions are socially e¢ cient given the available information, the entry decision
in the sequential mechanism is more e¢ cient (in expectation) whenever the entry decisions
player observes a price that he thought he would never see, he should revise his views about how the game
is being played so that what he has observed is consistent with equilibrium behavior) ￿also suggest this is
the only natural equilibrium.
11in the two mechanisms di⁄er.31 Both mechanisms select e¢ ciently among all bidders who
actually enter, so:
Proposition 1: The Sequential mechanism is more e¢ cient than the Auction.
Note that when ￿j = 1 8j ￿the ￿in￿nite potential bidder case￿ ￿the lowest deterring type
must bid its full value, v*; to deter, since it will otherwise surely face entry by someone with
at least as high a value and will therefore earn zero surplus. So the deterring price always
equals v* in this case.32 Since the expected pro￿t of any potential entrant, conditional on
there being no previous bidder above the cuto⁄, is
R v
x=v*[x￿v*]f(x)dx￿c; (3) implies that in
this case bidders all earn zero expected pro￿ts in the VK equilibrium. So the VK equilibrium
is not only e¢ cient but fully extractive if there is an in￿nite number of potential bidders.
3.3 Revenue
The auction usually beats the sequential mechanism on revenue.
We begin by showing that if the auction yields more revenue for some f￿jg1
j=1, then it
is also superior for any weakly lower sequence of f￿jg1
j=1. The intuition is simply that the
sequential mechanism￿ s advantage is that it may attract more bidders than the auction.
The proof is not immediate, though, because the sequential mechanism encourages bidders
to signal with high bids in early stages so, for example, conditional on only one entrant
actually existing ex-post, the sequential mechanism earns more revenue on average, ex-post,
than the auction (which then earns the minimum possible price). Because the payments of a
winning bidder are a function of other players￿bids and possibly the sequence of subsequent
￿j￿ s; a direct computation and comparison of pro￿ts is both intricate and tedious.
However, because the expected revenue from any mechanism is the expectation of the
MR of the winning bidder, MR analysis (following Bulow and Roberts (1989) and Bulow
and Klemperer (1996)) allows us to calculate each winner￿ s contribution to expected revenue
strictly as a function of its expected MR, without reference to other bidders￿values or
31Note when v* = VS a potential entrant is just indi⁄erent to entering, and so entry is a matter of
indi⁄erence for e¢ ciency as well. However, the entry decision is then strictly more e¢ cient than in the
auction when bidders cease entering the auction even though none have yet bid VS:
(The extra entry that takes place in the sequential mechanism is thus ￿business-stealing￿but not welfare-
reducing, see Mankiw and Whinston (1986).)




The key is that neither the number of bidders who would enter an auction if they exist,
n*, nor the entry-deterring value is a⁄ected by any of the ￿j (of course, the entry-deterring
prices would be a⁄ected), so the e⁄ect of reducing any ￿j is simply to shift probability
from the events that the jth and subsequent bidders exist, to the event that the j ￿ 1st
bidder is the last, without changing the expected marginal revenues conditional on these
di⁄erent events. Since the auction is always more pro￿table if there are n* or fewer bidders,34
while adding additional bidders beyond n* makes a contribution to pro￿ts in the sequential
mechanism but cannot a⁄ect the auction, the result follows straightforwardly (see Appendix
for details):35
Lemma 4: For any given value of v*; if the Auction is more pro￿table in expectation than
the Sequential mechanism for some sequence f￿jg1
j=1 then the Auction is more pro￿table in
expectation for any weakly lower sequence of f￿jg1
j=1.
We can now show that the auction is superior in expected revenue to the sequential
mechanism under likely conditions:
Proposition 2: The Auction is more pro￿table in expectation than the Sequential mech-
anism
if (i) the equilibrium of the latter is its unique perfect sequential equilibrium and S(￿) is
convex (as it is for economists￿most commonly used distributions of demand)
and/or if (ii)
Qj=n*+1
j=3 ￿j is su¢ ciently small (i.e., the probability of at least n*+1 po-
33For example, as noted above, conditional on only one entrant actually existing, ex post the auction￿ s
expected pro￿ts are strictly less than the sequential mechanism￿ s but, of course, the two mechanisms￿
expected marginal revenues are equal, because the real contribution of the ￿rst entrant is the same in both
mechanisms. (More generally, marginal-revenue analysis focuses on the real contribution of each potential
bidder to pro￿ts - whether by bidding high, or whether by encouraging others to bid higher earlier because
of the threat the bidder poses in which cases some of the pro￿ts are realised in states in which the bidder
does not actually exist.)
34This is essentially Myerson (1981)￿ s standard result that the simple auction maximises revenue among
mechanisms that always result in a sale. But unlike Myerson we do not need to assume ￿downward sloping￿
marginal revenue or any other regularity assumption.
35For the reason given above, this argument would fail if expressed in terms of state-by-state revenues
rather than state-by-state marginal revenues. This is exactly as in ordinary monopoly theory: by setting a
higher or lower price than the optimum a monopolist can raise the contribution to pro￿ts (price less cost)
of some units, but it will weakly lower the contribution to marginal revenue less marginal cost of every unit
sold (since the optimum is set at MR=MC); that is, there is state-by-state dominance in marginal revenues,
but not in prices. (See Bulow and Klemperer (1996) for another application of state-by-state dominance
in MRs where there is no dominance in prices or revenues.)
13tential entrants existing, conditional on at least two existing, is su¢ ciently small).
Proof : Part (i): by Lemma 4, if the result holds for ￿j = 1 8j; it holds for all
f￿jg1
j=1: Also, S(VS) = c ￿ EfS(v2(n*))g ￿ SfE(v2(n*))g, in which the equality is the
entry condition for the sequential mechanism (equation (2)); the ￿rst inequality is the entry
condition for the auction (an (n*+1)st potential entrant would not want to enter the auction
given that it would compete against a bidder whose value exceeds the second-highest of the
n* previous entrants￿values, v2(n*)); and the second inequality is Jensen￿ s inequality (if S(￿)
is convex). So, since S0(￿) < 0, we have VS ￿ E(v2(n*)): Since if ￿j = 1 8j; the expected
revenue from the auction = E(v2(n*)); and the revenue from the sequential mechanism
= v* (see Lemma 2); v*= VS su¢ ces for the result:
Part (ii): under this condition, the probability of n*+1 or more potential bidders is
su¢ ciently small that the greater expected marginal revenue (EMR) of the winning bidder
in the auction, when there are at least 2 and no more than n* potential bidders (see the
discussion leading to, and proof of, Lemma 4), dominates the possibly-greater EMR of the
sequential mechanism when more than n* potential bidders exist.￿
There are three reasons why the auction is usually strictly more pro￿table than the
sequential mechanism. These correspond to the facts that each of the ￿rst three inequali-
ties in the proof of part (i) (namely f￿jg1
j=1 ￿ 1, c ￿ EfS(v2(n*))g, and EfS(v2(n*))g ￿
SfE(v2(n*))g) are usually strict; they also correspond to the factors listed in the introduc-
tion.
First, there is never an in￿nite stream of potential bidders in practice (i.e., ￿j < 1; for
some36 j > 2). Since the advantage of the sequential mechanism is only when a long tail of
bidders actually enters, reducing the likely number of potential bidders reduces its chance
of beating the auction, as discussed in Lemma 4.
Second, the jump-bids in the sequential mechanism are ￿￿ne-tuned￿to make entry just
barely unattractive to an additional bidder, while the expected pro￿t of the marginal bidder
who does not enter the auction is generally strictly negative (i.e., c > EfS(v2(n*))g).
Third, surplus from entry conditional on the value of the second highest bidder is likely
to be convex (i.e., EfS(v2(n*))g > SfE(v2(n*))g). If S(v) were the surplus obtained by a
new entrant who faces a bidder with a value equal to v (and so faces a price equal to v),
the inequality would be immediate from the standard consumer-theory result that a buyers￿
36To see the need for j > 2, see the proof of Lemma 4.
14surplus is convex in the price it faces.37 However, because S(v) is the surplus obtained
by a new entrant who faces a bidder with a value above v; the inequality combines two
separate factors (a) the consumer theory result applied to the values of the winners of the
mechanisms, and (b) the relationship between the values of the winners and the prices they
pay.
Both issues depend upon the fact that even if there were an in￿nite number of potential
bidders, and the expected values of the winners of the two mechanisms were the same, the
dispersion of values faced by a new entrant into the auction would be greater than the
dispersion of values faced by a new entrant into the sequential mechanism. More precisely,
the distribution of the winner￿ s value in the sequential mechanism would second-order sto-
chastically dominate the distribution of the winner￿ s value in the auction in the sense of
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), because the former value is distributed according to F(￿)
truncated below at VS, while the latter value is distributed according to a convex function
of F(￿); namely F n*(￿):
To understand this, see Figure 1 which pictures the case of uniform F(￿), so that the
truncated density is a constant above VS, while the density of F n*(￿) is increasing. [INSERT
FIGURE 1 HERE]. So the truncated density must be the higher at VS, since both densities
integrate to 1. It must therefore also be the lower at v if both densities have the same
mean. So the densities cross just twice, and the truncated distribution is therefore less
risky. Considering a general F(￿) simply distorts this picture without a⁄ecting the ￿two-
crossings￿property.38
Factor (a), then, is that, conditional on the two processes having the same expected
winning value, a new entrant would ￿nd the auction more attractive because its distribution
of winning values is more dispersed.
Factor (b) ￿namely the relationship between the value of the winner and the price it pays
￿depends on the relationship of MR to v. Since the expected revenue of any mechanism
is the expected MR of the winning bidder, the same second-order stochastic dominance
relationship would make the auction more (less) pro￿table if MR is convex (concave) in v,
37The entrant can be thought of as having an option to buy at the value of the highest competitor and,
for any given value of the entrant, that option becomes more valuable as the distribution of the prospective
purchase price becomes more dispersed.
38For v > e v, the ratio of the densities of ￿(F(￿) ) and (v j v ￿ e v) is [￿
0(F(￿)) f(￿)]=[
f(￿)
1￿F(e v)] which is
increasing if ￿
00(￿) > 0: In this case the former density is ￿rst higher (for v < e v); then lower, and ￿nally
higher again, and so is second-order stochastically dominated by, the latter, if the expectations are equal.
15if the means of the expected high values were the same.
So all four factors go in the same direction if MR(v) is convex ( d2
dv2MR(v) ￿ 0)39, and
this is therefore a very easily su¢ cient condition for expected revenue to be greater in the
auction than in the sequential mechanism.
For the demand functions most commonly used by economists ￿ linear, exponential,
and constant elasticity ￿ MR(v) is a¢ ne (i.e., d2
dv2MR(v) = 0 everywhere),40 so the auction
clearly raises more revenue in all of these cases.
As an example, consider bidders with valuations uniformly distributed on [0;1], that
is F(v) = v for v 2 [0;1]: This corresponds to bidders forming a linear demand curve
p = 1 ￿ q; in the limiting case where there are m such bidders each demanding 1=m units
at their values, as m ! 1: If c = :06; the auction would attract up to n*= 3 bidders and
yield expected revenue of .50 if there are at least three potential bidders. A fourth bidder
would have an expected loss of exactly :01 and so would not enter.
To have the same expected winner￿ s value, even with an in￿nite supply of potential
bidders, the sequential mechanism￿ s cuto⁄, VS; would need to be .50 - see Figure 1. But
to reduce a new entrant￿ s expected pro￿ts to ￿:01, a bidder in the sequential mechanism
would have to credibly signal only that its value exceeded 1 ￿
p
:3 ￿ :452:41 So roughly
.50￿:45 = :05 of the extra revenue of the auction over that from the sequential mechanism
is attributable purely to ￿convexity of surplus￿ : although the auction yields an expected
winner￿ s value of .75; the sequential mechanism only needs an expected winner￿ s value of
:726 to reduce an entrant￿ s net pro￿ts to -.01, because its winner￿ s value is less dispersed.
Because MR(v) = 2v ￿ 1, with MR neither concave nor convex, the di⁄erence in the
expected value of the winner (here, between :75 and :726) translates linearly into twice that
di⁄erence in expected revenues.
If bidders pool on jump bids that make a new entrant￿ s expected pro￿ts 0 instead of ￿:01,
39MR convexity is equivalent to concavity in the inverse hazard rate (or 2(h0(v))2 ￿ h(v)h00(v); in which
h(v) ￿
f(v)
1￿F(v) = the hazard rate).
It is not hard to show that if expected demand is convex (i.e., f0(￿) ￿ 0); a su¢ cient condition for S(￿) to
be convex is h0(￿) ￿ 0:
40For all these cases, the ratio of the slope of MR to the slope of (inverse) demand (v) is constant: for
uniformly-distributed signals (F(v) =
v￿v
v￿v), which generate linear demand, the ratio of the slope of MR to
the slope of demand = 1
2; for constant-elasticity distributed signals (F(v) = 1 ￿ (v
v)￿; ￿ < ￿1), the ratio
=
￿
￿+1; and for exponentially-distributed signals (F(v) = 1 ￿ e￿￿(v￿v)); which generate log-linear demand;
the ratio = 1.
41This is because S(1 ￿
p
:3) = :05, and so if c = :06 a new bidder would have an expected loss of .01.
16then the cuto⁄ value is lowered to :40; 42 extending the auction￿ s advantage by another :05.
Finally, if there were only three potential bidders (so ￿j = 1 for j ￿ 3 and zero otherwise),
the ￿￿nite supply of bidders￿reduces the sequential mechanism￿ s expected revenue by .05
more, to about .35 while leaving the auction￿ s revenue unchanged at .50: This example is
described in detail in the Appendix.
Of course, by choosing c so that an additional entrant is barely deterred in an auction
(so c = :05 here) and ￿j = 1 8j the last two e⁄ects are nulli￿ed. But even then, for the seller
to prefer the sequential mechanism, the lower dispersion of the sequential mechanism￿ s high
value (worth the di⁄erence between .50 and .45 in the above example) must be compensated
by concavity in the MR function. However, for MR concavity to matter much would
require a relatively large dispersion in the high value in the auction relative to the sequential
mechanism. And the larger that dispersion, the larger the expected value of the high value
must be in the auction (relative to the sequential mechanism) to deter entry, making it that
much more di¢ cult for the sequential mechanism to catch up ￿ even ignoring the other
two factors. So, for the seller to prefer the sequential mechanism requires several stars to
be aligned ￿ and for the seller to realize that they are so.
Nevertheless, it is possible to ￿nd counterexamples ￿in particular by choosing a distri-
bution with a marginal revenue function that is essentially ￿ at at higher values (so that
the higher expected v1 does little for the auction) and that conveniently becomes sharply
lower just below VS (so that the auction is disproportionately punished for low outcomes)
￿ and then combining this with a large stream of potential bidders and a carefully chosen
c: For such an example, assume bidders are equally likely to have the values 0, 8
11, and 1 (or
a continuous approximation to this three point distribution) and ￿j = 1 8j: The expected
revenue from the sequential mechanism then exceeds the expected revenue from the auction
if (but only if) c 2 ( 80
1782; 81
1782), in which case c is low enough that VS = 8
11 and yet high
enough that only 3 bidders enter the auction, so the greater chance that revenue will be 0
in the auction matters more than the possibility that the auction￿ s revenue will be 1.43
If v*= VK the sequential mechanism is both socially optimal and fully extractive, as we
have seen in section 3.2, and therefore it must beat the auction in expectation if (but only
42This is because S(:4) = :06 = c; so VS = :4:
43To calculate the continuous distribution analogue, note that a deterred entrant expects zero pro￿ts from
entry if v*= VS; so a buyer with value 8
11 enters with probability 11c
1￿11c. The expected value of the winner
in the auction, .892, comfortably exceeds the expected value of the winner in the sequential mechanism
(between .864 and .865 depending on c).
17if) the number of potential bidders is su¢ ciently greater than n*.
In short, there is a reasonable presumption that the expected price is higher in the
auction than in the sequential mechanism:
3.4 Bidders￿Preferences
Since the seller￿ s pro￿ts are usually higher in the auction, but social welfare is lower, bidders￿
surplus must usually be lower also. We now show that not only does this result usually hold
for total bidders￿surplus, but that it is even more likely to hold for the surplus of the
￿rst bidder to enter. So the casual-empirical observation that the ￿rst bidder to enter will
generally seek to pre-empt an auction is borne out. We begin by showing (see Appendix for
details):
Lemma 5: In the unique perfect sequential equilibrium of the Sequential mechanism,
fewer bidders enter, in expectation, than in the Auction.
The intuition is that the sequential mechanism sorts bidders better, in that entry stops
as soon as one bidder with a high enough value to deter future entrants is found, while
the auction attracts a random number of high-value bidders and therefore on average needs
more bidders to achieve the same degree of entry deterrence. We now have (see Appendix):
Lemma 6: The ￿rst bidder obtains a larger fraction of the total bidder surplus, in expec-
tation, in the unique perfect sequential equilibrium of the Sequential mechanism than in the
Auction.
The intuition is that not only are there fewer bidders on average among whom to split the
surplus (see the previous Lemma), but also the surplus is tilted towards the ￿rst bidder in
the sequential mechanism, because that bidder sometimes deters others in that mechanism,
while all of the ￿rst n* bidders always enter the auction if they exist.
It follows straightforwardly (see Appendix) that:
Proposition 3: The Auction yields lower total bidder surplus, surplus per participating
bidder, and surplus of the ￿rst entrant, in expectation, than the Sequential mechanism if (i)
the equilibrium of the latter is its unique perfect sequential equilibrium, and S(￿) is convex
and/or if (ii)
Qj=n*+1
j=3 ￿j is su¢ ciently small.
18If both conditions (i) and (ii) fail, and the sequential mechanism has v*= VK when
￿j = 1 8j, the auction is more attractive to all bidders. It is also possible to ￿nd examples
in which all bidders prefer the auction with v*= VS when ￿j = 1 8j (and S(￿) is not
convex), but parameters must be chosen very carefully ￿such examples are clearly even
more restricted than those for which the seller prefers the sequential mechanism.44
In short, bidders, especially those ￿at the front of the queue￿(who are the most in￿ u-
ential), mostly prefer sequential mechanisms; our model supports the advice that bidders
should avoid auctions if possible.
3.5 Simultaneous (Random) Entry into the Auction
No important result is a⁄ected if potential bidders make simultaneous, instead of sequential,
entry decisions into the auction.45 The logic of Proposition 2 holds exactly as before: because
the second-highest value in the auction is random the auction price must be higher than the
sequential mechanism￿ s price to deter entry, if S(￿) is convex.46 And since the random-entry
auction is less e¢ cient than the auction of our basic model (bidders have less information
when they make their entry decisions), the auction remains less e¢ cient than the sequential
mechanism (Proposition 1). Obviously, our other Propositions are also una⁄ected.
44The example we gave in the previous subsection, for which the seller preferred the sequential mechanism,
is also one in which the auction is the most attractive mechanism for bidders in total surplus, surplus
per participating bidder, and surplus for the ￿rst entrant ￿of course, the set of f￿jg1
j=1 for which these
statements hold is even smaller than the set for which seller prefers the sequential mechanism. (If ￿j = 1 8j;
the ￿rst bidder￿ s expected surplus is 28
297 ￿ c and 27
297 ￿ c in the auction and the sequential mechanism,
respectively.)
45For example, Reiley (2005) shows that random entry models the entry of bidders in internet auctions
better than deterministic entry does.
46We can assume either that potential bidders only know the distribution of the number of other potential
entrants when they make their entry decisions or as in, e.g., Levin and Smith (1994), that they know the
actual number of potential entrants. In either case, the proof is essentially unchanged if we simply replace
v2(n*) by the actual second-highest value of whatever (random) number of bidders actually enter. (Although
when no bidders actually enter a random-entry auction, an additional bidder would only have to pay the
price the seller would receive absent his bid (instead of a higher price) this just makes entry more attractive,
so reinforces the result that the auction must o⁄er greater expected revenue to deter further entry.)
The random-entry auction may be either more or less pro￿table than the auction of our basic model. If
the basic auction yields zero expected pro￿ts for bidders then it must be superior because it is more e¢ cient.
If, on the other hand, an additional bidder would only just be deterred from entering the basic auction,
then random entry may entail n*+1 bidders who almost always enter, which is superior to having just n*
enter for certain.
193.6 The Crucial Role of Jump Bidding
Prospective entrants in the sequential mechanism learn information about earlier bidders￿
values both by observing those bidders competing with one another, and by observing any
pre-emptive jump bids. But the greater e¢ ciency of the sequential mechanism relative to
the auction is entirely because entrants compete until there is a single survivor prior to any
further entry; given that competition, the survivor￿ s ability to jump bid to deter further
entry makes no di⁄erence to expected e¢ ciency. The reason is that bidders ￿ne-tune their
jump bids to be the lowest possible to deter entry, that is, to make any prospective new
entrant just indi⁄erent about entering. So since prospective new entrants make socially
e¢ cient decisions given their information (Lemma 3), outcomes would be equally e¢ cient
in expectation if the jumps that are made did not deter entry, and so also equally e¢ cient
if jump bids were impossible (details are in the Appendix):
Proposition 4: The expected e¢ ciency of the unique perfect sequential equilibrium of the
Sequential mechanism would be una⁄ected if jump bids were not possible.
So on average jump bids have no e⁄ect on expected social surplus. But they play a key
role in transferring pro￿ts from sellers to buyers. When there are no rents to be earned
from bidder scarcity (￿j = 1 8j) bidder pro￿ts are entirely due to the ability to make jump
bids: absent jump bidding, a potential entrant knows only that the current incumbent￿ s
value exceeds the actual value of the second-highest-value entrant to date. So entry will
continue until the value of the second-highest-value entrant is at least VS; at which point
the competition between the two highest-value entrants will demonstrate that at least one
has a value above VS, and there will be no subsequent entry. So, with an in￿nite supply of
potential entrants, each new entrant knows it will win only if and when it beats one bidder
whose value exceeds VS: So it expects to earn zero pro￿ts (by equation (2)), that is:
Proposition 5: If jump bids were not possible in the Sequential mechanism, and there is
an in￿nite supply of potential entrants, all bidders would earn zero surplus.
Because the ￿no jump bidding￿mechanism would be both fully extractive (when ￿j =
1 8j) and as e¢ cient as the perfect sequential equilibrium of our basic sequential mechanism,
which is in turn more e¢ cient than the auction, it must yield higher expected revenue than
20the auction in this case. (Of course, the auction remains more pro￿table if su¢ ciently
few potential entrants are expected ￿Part (ii) of Proposition 2 holds exactly as before.)
But, while these results help explain the role of jump bidding, it is unclear as a practical
matter how a seller would be able to simultaneously enforce the requirement on sequential
English auction bidding and the prohibition on jump bidding which are both necessary to
implement this procedure. So we turn in the next section to more plausible modi￿cations of
the sequential mechanism.
4 Modi￿cations of the Sequential Mechanism
4.1 Entry Subsidies
Since our analysis so far suggests that the auction is typically much more pro￿table than
the sequential mechanism, the obvious question is whether the sequential mechanism can be
improved for the seller. We now extend our basic model by assuming the seller also knows
F(￿);c; and f￿jg1
j=1:
Of course, if the seller can pre-commit to a set of rules and the full common knowledge
assumptions obtain, it can extract all surplus by pre-committing to a sequence of entry
fees and subsidies that assure e¢ cient entry and no expected surplus for buyers. This
seems unrealistic.47 But it is natural to ask whether there is any simple modi￿cation of the
basic sequential mechanism that yields an outcome corresponding to the seller￿ s ￿favorite￿
equilibrium (v*= VK), while satisfying the perfect sequential equilibrium re￿nement that is
usually imposed?
The answer is ￿yes￿ , provided the seller has all this information. If the seller has the
ability to partially subsidize new entry, this raises the signal (and therefore the price) needed
to deter entry. In particular, if the size of the possible subsidy is chosen correctly, incumbent
bidders with values between VS and VK are prevented from being able to pool with those
above VK: Even better, when the weaker types are separated from the stronger ones an
unsubsidized entrant will compete against them. So while the threat of the subsidy is
necessary, the subsidy never actually needs to be paid! The outcome is therefore exactly
the same as the VK equilibrium we discussed earlier, and is therefore more pro￿table than
the auction for ￿j = 1 8j. So we have (for details of the proof, see the Appendix):
47For f￿jg1
j=1 ￿su¢ ciently large￿(i.e., ￿su¢ ciently close￿to ￿j = 1 8j); another strategy that ￿if credible
￿can increase entry and so seller pro￿tability is to commit to not allow the incumbent bidder to raise its
bid in response to new competition. Edlin (2002) discusses regulatory regimes based on this principle.
21Proposition 6: Consider the Sequential mechanism with the additional feature that after
any buyer enters and bids, the seller has the ability but not the obligation to o⁄er to subsidise
up to c￿S(VK) of the next potential entrant￿ s cost of ￿nding out its value. The unique
perfect sequential equilibrium of this mechanism is more pro￿table in expectation than the
Auction for a set of sequences of f￿jg1
j=1 that includes ￿j = 1 8j.48 Buyers with values
below VK cannot deter entry, but no subsidies are paid in equilibrium.
Clearly the modi￿ed sequential mechanism will be more pro￿table than the auction for
sequences of f￿jg1
j=1 that are ￿close enough￿to ￿j = 1 8j, but the argument of Proposition
2 part (ii) shows that for ￿su¢ ciently small￿f￿jg1
j=1 the auction remains more pro￿table.49
4.2 Lock-ups, Break-up Fees, and Matching Rights
The previous subsection shows that entry subsidies can make the sequential mechanism
both more e¢ cient and more pro￿table than the auction. By making entry subsidies larger
still, the sequential mechanism can often be made even more pro￿table, by further raising
the signal required to deter entry.50
However, if the seller has the ability to o⁄er larger subsidies than c￿S(VK), then subsi-
dies must sometimes actually be paid ￿even in circumstances in which a subsidy would not
have had to be paid if large subsidies were not possible ￿because bidders who fear future
high subsidies to attract entry against them may need to be paid to be persuaded to enter
today.51 Furthermore, the gains to the seller from reducing buyer surplus are reduced by
the ine¢ ciency of the incremental entry induced by these larger subsidies.
The seller could do better than simply o⁄ering large subsidies if it could pre-commit to
48In fact, any perfect Nash equilibrium of the sequential mechanism with this feature is more pro￿table
in expectation than the auction for a set of f￿jg1
j=1 that includes ￿j = 1 8j.
49If, for example, the probability of an additional bidder is a constant, ￿ (i.e., ￿j = ￿ ￿ 1 8j > 1) then,
by the argument of Lemma 4, the modi￿ed sequential mechanism is more pro￿table than the auction if and
only if ￿ ￿ e ￿ for some e ￿ (e ￿ depends on c and F(￿)):
50If, by contrast, the subsidy that can be paid to a new entrant is smaller than c￿S(VK), some types of
incumbent bidder with values below VK can deter further entry. For uniform F(￿), for example, the auction
(without subsidies) is more pro￿table than the sequential mechanism (8f￿jg1
j=1) if the allowable subsidy
is less than about half of c ￿ S(VK). (The critical fraction below which the auction is always superior is
always in the range 1
2 ￿ 1
n*+1.)
51In particular, when large subsidies are feasible a ￿rst bidder with a value above VK may prefer to make
the minimum allowable bid and risk entry if ￿2 is small, rather than bid VK to deter entry (because a lower
bid that simply signals a value of VK may not ￿by contrast with the low-subsidy case ￿be enough to deter
entry); the second bidder may then require a subsidy since it may have to face future highly-subsidized
entry (it will certainly require a subsidy if ￿j = 1 8 j > 2).
22avoiding future ine¢ cient subsidies. In particular, it could bene￿t from a provision that
prohibited it from paying any further subsidies to additional bidders if the current entrant
signalled a value of at least VK.
Such a combination of a subsidy to a current entrant and a promise to limit future
subsidies parallels the common practice of sellers of public companies of o⁄ering ￿lock-ups￿
that include a break-up fee (equivalent to cash paid out of corporate assets) and ￿matching
rights￿that prohibit subsidies to future bidders in return for a su¢ ciently high bid.52
So our analysis suggests a role for lock-up-like combinations of current subsidies and
promises about future subsidies, but the details will depend not only on the bargaining
power of the seller against any new entrant, but also on the speci￿cation of the bargaining
protocol between the seller and the current incumbent (since bargaining between these actors
can lead to even more e¢ cient outcomes). This is beyond the scope of the current paper.
However, we are sceptical of the broad use of subsidies in practice. Subsidies can easily
be abused by a seller who wishes to bias the process. It is not uncommon to see the board
of a target company granting subsidies (with matching rights) to an initial bidder that has
made a deal with management, e⁄ectively deterring other bidders.53 And potential ￿rst
bidders may be deterred by the possibility of the board paying subsidies to a management-
led counter-bid or other favored alternative bidder.54
Even putting aside both this moral hazard problem, and the problem of attracting non-
52A break-up fee guarantees the bidder a ￿xed sum in return for making its o⁄er, payable if the deal fails
to be completed ￿typically because of a topping o⁄er by another bidder ￿and are typically accompanied
by ￿matching rights￿ . Since the break-up fee is a sunk cost once agreed to, it only distorts an auction if
the recipient makes an initial o⁄er above its value in order to receive it. See Ayres (1990). Che and Lewis
(forthcoming) show the merits of breakup fees in Fishman (1988)￿ s model. (Sometimes buyers will o⁄er
sellers break-up fees, for example, as protection against a deal collapsing because of antitrust problems.
Break-up fees are limited to 1% of the value of the bid in the UK, but can be much higher in the US.)
Related issues are discussed by Rothkopf, Harstad and Fu (2003).
53Paying break-up fees to initial bidders is especially suspect. Consider, for example, the recent $33 billion
buyout of hospital owner HCA, which gave the group that included management a $300 million break-up
fee and matching rights in return for an o⁄er that exceeded the pre-takeover valuation by about $3 billion.
Since the management group was probably also better informed than any potential rival, it is no surprise
that investment bankers were then unable to ￿nd a competing o⁄er.
54For example, if ￿j = 1 8j and the ￿rst potential bidder perceives any risk that future subsidies will
be larger than optimal, it will never enter, since it would be forced to either bid above VK or to su⁄er
subsidised competition.
A further concern arises if management can pay subsidies in shares. Giving shares is cheaper than paying
cash, because the recipient values them more than the seller ￿either the recipient sells out at the sale
price that would have resulted anyway, or the recipient is the ￿nal winner and so values them more than
this, and because it gives the recipient a toe-hold advantage (see Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999)). So
management has a temptation to o⁄er a subsidy in shares even against a bid of VK ￿but no bidder will
then be prepared to make an original bid of VK.
23genuine bidders who pocket subsidies without investigating serious bids,55 the tactics con-
sidered here depend sensitively on the seller￿ s information. The basic sequential mechanism
and the auction can be implemented by a seller who knows nothing about the distribution
of bidders￿values, or bidders￿perception of that distribution, or their cost of entry. But
the tactics here require knowledge of all these things. And with endogenous entry the im-
plementation of an ￿optimal mechanism￿is fraught with danger: there is a small di⁄erence
between a tactic that extracts all surplus and one that discourages all entry. So while the
ability to o⁄er a limited special deal to a ￿white knight￿involving paying its fees, or giving
it cheap options or a lock-up, can increase expected revenue, this depends upon the seller
being a revenue-maximiser with su¢ cient informational resources56 and commitment powers
to ￿ne￿ tune its use of these tactics.
In addition, of course, even with modi￿cations, the sequential mechanism beats the
auction only if f￿jg1
j=1 is ￿close enough￿to ￿j = 1 8j, (perhaps unlikely in the context of
company sales). So while a subsidy might be a useful device in some circumstances, at the
very least one must handle with care.
4.3 Buyers￿Bargaining Power
While sellers may be able to increase their leverage by threatening to subsidize entry, buyers
may be able to improve their position, and reduce expected revenues in the sequential
mechanism, if they can build a reputation for exiting if an o⁄er they make is not accepted.
In the extreme case where sequential buyers can all fully commit to making take-it-or-leave-it
o⁄ers, and ￿j = 0 for at least one (perhaps large) j, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium
is for the ￿rst bidder to make an o⁄er of v with the seller accepting. (The game is trivial to
solve recursively.)
The more general principle is that if there is a high enough chance that a buyer will
leave then the seller may be forced to accept a price that would not deter future bidders,
because of the risk of losing the current bidder. The increase in buyer￿ s surplus from the
55Giving break-up fees and matching rights only in return for a ￿good￿o⁄er mitigate the second problem
but without eliminating it (it is usually not hard for a winner to ￿nd an excuse to withdraw) and at the
cost of possibly introducing ine¢ ciency (see note 52).
56Not only must the seller have enough information about the distribution of the bidders￿values, and the
probability of further potential entrants being available, but the seller must also be known not to have too
much information - if the seller is thought to have more information than the bidders about the probability
of a further potential entrant, for example, then the current potential bidder may be reluctant to deal with
the seller.
24lower price plus the e¢ ciency loss from reduced entry causes a double hit to the seller.
While it may be di¢ cult for buyers to credibly commit to withdraw from a simple sequen-
tial process (and such a threat may be even less e⁄ective in an auction), it is perhaps more
likely that prospective buyers will be able to threaten to withdraw if subsidies are o⁄ered
to competitors ￿we often observe bidders negotiating for matching rights that e⁄ectively
eliminate subsidies, in return for making an initial o⁄er.
5 Conclusion
It is an old saw that ￿An economist is someone who sees something working in practice, and
asks whether it can work in theory.￿ 57 Our bottom line is that auctions usually are best, in
theory as well as in practice.
We have shown that buyers generally prefer to make pre-emptive bids that avoid auctions
and force a sequential process. But if the seller initiates the sale it chooses an auction which
is not as pro￿table for buyers.
The auction is better for the seller, even though it reveals information less e¢ ciently,
because it has three advantages related to entry. First, it requires only a limited number
of potential bidders to achieve its maximum expected revenue; the sequential mechanism￿ s
advantage in being able to consider more buyers if earlier o⁄ers are too low is only relevant
if the number of potential bidders signi￿cantly exceeds the number that would participate
in an auction. Second, buyers￿ability to make jump bids that just deter entry increase their
expected pro￿ts at the expense of expected seller revenue. Third, the greater dispersion
in the winner￿ s value in the auction means its expected value must also be higher ￿and
although it does not follow that the price it pays is necessarily higher, the greater entry
means it usually will be.
When are auctions best? Unless the seller has the information and ability to credibly
subsidize just the right amount of entry, the auction is better except under delicate condi-
tions under which demand curvature, bidding costs, and a large supply of potential bidders
align to overcome both the higher expected top value in the auction and the pro￿ts from
pre-emptive bidding in the sequential mechanism. If a seller has only limited information
about valuations, entry costs, or the number of bidders, or needs to standardize procedures
57We are not sure where this aphorism originates. The ￿rst recorded use we are aware of is by Ronald
Reagan in a 1987 speech.
25across many sales, an auction is its best bet for expected revenue. If the likely number of
bidders is small, the advantage of an auction is particularly large.
Taking a broader perspective, this paper, and Bulow and Klemperer (1996), both show
the power of competition. Bulow and Klemperer (1996) showed that the extra competition
provided by a single extra bidder dominates the extra value of any clever negotiating strate-
gies or regulatory schemes that might be designed to extract more rents from competing
￿rms. The main result of this paper is that the straightforward, level-playing-￿eld competi-
tion that a simple auction creates is likely to be more pro￿table than a sequential procedure
that will sometimes attract more bidders and often ensure a higher minimum price, but
prevents direct, simultaneous competition among all participants on equal terms.
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306 Appendix ￿Examples and some Proofs
Examples of the Equilibrium of the Sequential Mechanism:
Let bidders￿values be drawn from the uniform distribution F(v) = v for v 2 [0;1]. Then
(2) =) VS = 1 ￿
p
6c; that is, a potential entrant would be just indi⁄erent to entering
against an incumbent with a value in the range [1 ￿
p
6c;1] (the probability of defeating
such an incumbent will be 1
2
p










6c ￿ c = 0):
Let c = :06; so VS = :4: So ￿starting from any point of the game, and independent of
past history or future {￿jg ￿a bidder must signal that it has a value of at least :4 to deter
further entry. It can do this by making a bid that, if its value were .4, would give it the
same surplus if it successfully deterred entry as if it did not jump bid and accommodated
further entry.
3-bidder Example
If there are exactly 3 bidders (￿j = 1 for j ￿ 3; and zero otherwise); a ￿rst bidder with
the deterring value of :4 who chose not to deter would win with probability (:4)2, and earn
1
3(:4) conditional on winning, yielding an expected pro￿t of :0213. So if the ￿rst bidder￿ s
value is .4 or more it will jump bid to :4￿:0213 = :3787 and there will be no further entry.
If the ￿rst bidder￿ s value is less than .4, it will bid v = 0, the second bidder will then
enter, and the two bidders will raise the price continuously until the lower of their two actual
values is reached. Call this price p. If it was the second entrant that quit, the third bidder
then enters (it remains unpro￿table for the ￿rst bidder to deter) and if the third bidder￿ s
value exceeds p; the price continues to rise until the lower of the two remaining bidders￿
values is reached.
If, instead, it was the incumbent bidder (that is, the ￿rst entrant) that quit at p; the
new incumbent has the opportunity to jump bid to deter the ￿nal potential entrant. If the
new incumbent had the minimum deterring value, :4, but did not jump bid, its expected
pro￿t from competing with the third bidder would be p(:4￿p) (from the case in which the
third value is below p) plus 1
2(:4 ￿ p)2 (from the case in which the third value is between p
and :4) equals :08 ￿ p2=2: So if the second bidder￿ s value exceeds :4; it makes a jump bid
from p to :32 + p2=2 (> p) immediately after defeating the ￿rst bidder at the price p, and
there is then no further entry. If its value is below :4 it does not jump bid, the third bidder
then enters and, as before, if the third bidder￿ s value exceeds p the price then rises again
until the lower of the two remaining bidders￿values is reached.
To compute expected revenue directly, note that with probability :6 the ￿rst bidder
deters at price :3787. With probability :6(:4) = :24 the second bidder will deter the third
bidder after beating the ￿rst bidder at price p uniformly distributed between 0 and .4 and
31the deterring price is :32+p2=2; so the average price in this case equals
R :4
p=0(:32+p2=2)dp =
:3467. With probability :6(:4)2 = :096 neither of the ￿rst two bidders will deter and
the third bidder￿ s value is at least .4, so it will win at a price equal to the higher of the
￿rst two bidders￿values, which is on average (2=3):4 = :2667: Finally, with probability
(:4)3 = :064 all three bidders have values below :4 and the expected price will be the
expected second-highest of these three values, that is, (1=2):4 = :2: So total expected revenue
equals :6(:3787) + :24(:3467) + :096(:2667) + :064(:2) = :3488:
This calculation can be made much more easily using MR analysis: with probability :43
all three bidders have values between 0 and .4 and so MRs uniformly distributed between
-1 and -.2 (since ￿demand￿is linear when values are uniformly distributed). In this case,
the winner will be the highest-value bidder, and have the highest of these three MRs which
is, on average, ￿:4: With the remaining probability at least one bidder will have a value
above .4, and the ￿rst of these bidders in the queue will win yielding an expected MR of
.4.58 So total expected revenue equals (:4)3(￿:4) + (1 ￿ :43)(:4) = :3488:
It is easy to check that the auction￿ s expected revenue equals .5.
Constant-￿ Example
If instead ￿j = ￿ ￿ 1 8j ￿ 2; a new entrant with the deterring value of v* who defeated
an existing incumbent at price p but chose not to deter would win if no higher-value bidder
entered, and would then pay the maximum of p and the highest among subsequent entrants￿
values. The probability that no subsequent entrant￿ s value would exceed any amount x ￿ v*





, so the probability density of the highest among sub-








(1￿￿x)2 for p ￿ x ￿ v*; and this




















. So the deterring bid of any entrant whose value is v* or more, and who de-








To calculate expected revenue, we ￿nd the expected MR of the winning bidder. The
probability that there exists no bidder with a value above any x ￿ v* is 1 ￿ 1￿x
1￿￿x: So with
probability 1￿v*
1￿￿v* there will be a bidder with a value of at least v*, and so an expected MR








(1￿￿x)2 the winner￿ s value is x < v*,















￿2 ln(1 ￿ ￿v*):
In the perfect sequential equilibrium, v*= VS = 1 ￿
p
6c and, for c = :06; v*= VS = :4





f(x) )f(x)dx = b v:
59The logic for these calculations is exactly as in the 3-bidder example above. As there, it is possible, but
cumbersome, to compute expected revenue directly.
32(as in the 3-bidder example above): If, for example, ￿ = :8 the expected revenue ￿.29. (It
is not hard to check the auction￿ s expected revenue ￿.37.)
Proof of Proposition 3: Note that Lemmas 5 and 6 apply even for v*> VS if
Qj=n*+1
j=3 ￿j is
su¢ ciently small (using the same argument as for Lemma 6, since the probability of k > n*
entrants is su¢ ciently small), and the results are then immediate from these lemmas and
Propositions 1 and 2.￿
Proof of Proposition 4: Absent jump bidding, potential entrants￿information about
the incumbent￿ s value is only that it exceeds the value of the second-highest-value entrant
to date (which the competition between the bidders allows it to observe). So entry will
continue after the entry of the ￿rst bidder with a value above VS. However, entry that
takes place while there is just one bidder whose value exceeds VS is on average neutral for
e¢ ciency, since revealing only that the incumbent￿ s value exceeds VS would leave potential
entrants indi⁄erent about entering. Conditional on there having been two entrants whose
values exceed VS (so that the higher of these two bidders￿values must be drawn from a
distribution of F(￿) truncated somewhere above VS) further entry is socially undesirable,
but as soon as two such bidders have entered, the price will anyway be driven up to VS or
higher, thus deterring all further entry even without jump bidding.￿
Proof of Proposition 6: If, when the current high bid is p; a single ￿nal buyer enters,
the joint bene￿t to the new bidder and the seller is vj ￿ p if vj > p; and 0 otherwise,
where vj is the new bidder￿ s actual value, regardless of whether the incumbent outbids the
entrant. So from (3) the seller would like to induce (at least) one additional entrant if
p < VK: Therefore, since the seller can if it wishes subsidise any potential bidder so that
that bidder￿ s total entry costs are no more than S(VK); a price below VK would only deter
entry if it signalled that the deterring incumbent￿ s value was at least VK: Obviously, no
bidder with a value below VK will be willing to set a price above VK, so it follows that no
bidder with a value below VK will deter entry.
As in Lemma 2, in the unique perfect sequential equilibrium, the pool of deterring bidders
is as large as possible, so all those with values above VK will deter. Clearly no subsidy is then
required to induce entry if the potential entrant faces only bidders who have not deterred
(since an unsubsidized entrant earns at least zero in expectation if it will be able to buy at
a price no more than VK), and no feasible subsidy will induce entry once a deterring bid has
been made. Therefore, no subsidies are actually paid in this equilibrium.
Furthermore, (3) and the discussion in section 3.2 then imply the equilibrium is both
e¢ cient and fully extractive when ￿j = 1 8j; and so more pro￿table than the auction in this
case:￿
33Proof of Lemma 2: It is straightforward from the discussion in the text that it is a perfect
Nash equilibrium for any entrant, immediately after entry, to jump bid to the price that
deters any future entry, if and only if it has a value ￿ v*, for some v*￿ VS. Furthermore,
there cannot be a constant deterring ￿cut-o⁄￿value > VK; because if two bidders had values
> VK but < v* then a further new entrant would not be deterred and would face a minimum
price > VK: But its expected pro￿ts would be less than the pro￿ts from facing a ￿xed price
of VK; which from (3) are zero, which is a contradiction.60 So v* 2 [VS;VK].
The expected revenue equals the expected marginal revenue, MR; of the winning bidder:
the ￿rst term in (4) is v* times the probability that the winner￿ s value exceeds this cuto⁄
value (see note 58); the second term in (4) (which may be negative) sums the probability
that the game will end with exactly j bidders, all of whom have values less than v*, times
the expected MR of the high bidder contingent on j bidders with values all below v*:
Finally, consider any sequential equilibrium in which, at some stage, some bidders with
values ￿ VS do not deter; and at that stage let e p be the bid which type VS would be just
indi⁄erent about jumping to if such a jump bid did deter future entry. Then at this stage
of such an equilibrium (i) all types with values ￿ VS would deviate from their equilibrium
strategy to bidding e p if doing so did deter (since types that were anyway deterring would
thereby deter at a lower price, and other types above VS gain more than type VS gains
by deterring and therefore strictly gain) and (ii) no other type would deviate from its
equilibrium strategy to bidding e p even if doing so did successfully deter all further entry. So
a type of bidder with value ￿ VS failing to deter cannot, at any stage, be part of a perfect
sequential equilibrium. The unique perfect sequential equilibrium therefore has v*= VS:61￿
Proof of Lemma 3: In both mechanisms, the direct private and social cost of entering is
the same, that is, c.
In the auction the private and social contribution of each bidder is the same, namely zero
for everyone other than the winner and the di⁄erence between the top two values for the
winner. Since the expected contribution is therefore clearly also decreasing in the number
60Technically, this argument requires a positive probability of at least three potential entrants existing.
However, any equilibrium in which the ￿cut-o⁄value￿is above VK in any period not only fails the ￿intuitive
criterion￿ , but is not even robust to the ￿test of dominated messages￿(see Cho and Kreps (1987), and Kreps
(1990, p.436)): making the deterring bid corresponding to a ￿cut-o⁄value￿of VK is strictly dominated for all
types with values below VK (however any potential entrant would respond, all these types would do better
not to jump bid), so making this bid must be interpreted as signalling a value ￿ VK, and will therefore
prevent further entry.
61Strictly, if ￿j = 1 8j this argument proves only that this is the unique neologism-proof equilibrium. It
does not quite prove it is the unique perfect-sequential equilibrium, because a bidder with value below VS is
weakly willing to bid VS if ￿j = 1 8j, which spoils the exact Grossman-Perry argument (but not Farrell￿ s).
However, if bidders prefer no bid to a surely-losing one (e.g., there are small bidding costs) or of course if ￿j
< 1 for any j; all equilibria other than the constant-cuto⁄ equilibrium with v*= VS fail Grossman-Perry￿ s
exact re￿nement, as well as Farrell￿ s.
34of entrants, the correct number enter.
In the sequential mechanism, if no bidder with a value of v* or more has yet entered,
the social contribution from one more entry is at least
R v
x=v*(x ￿ v*)f(x)dx ￿ c so entry is
socially e¢ cient. Also, since the entrant will be able to deter entry through a bid no greater
than v*, it is also pro￿table to enter, even ignoring potential pro￿ts from winning with a
bid, or even a value, below v*: If a bidder with a value of v* or more has already entered,
it is ine¢ cient and unpro￿table for a new bidder to enter even ignoring the possibility of
others entering later: the expected private and social contributions from entry would be
S(v*) ￿ c (from Lemma 2, S(VS) = c and v*￿ VS), so the private and social choices are
again identical.￿
Proof of Lemma 4: The expected revenue from either mechanism equals the expected
marginal revenue (EMR) of the winner. Let EMRA(j) and EMRS(j) be the expected
marginal revenue of the winner of the auction and of the sequential mechanism, respectively,
conditional on exactly j potential entrants existing. EMRA(1) = EMRS(1) (since the
winner is the same in both mechanisms), EMRA(j) > EMRS(j);8j 2 [2;n*] (since in
these cases all the bidders enter the auction62); and EMRA(j)￿EMRS(j) is decreasing in
j for j ￿ n* (since for j ￿ n* EMRA(j) is obviously constant, while EMRS(j) is increasing
in j63).
Assume for some f￿jg1
j=1 the auction yields higher expected revenue, hence higher EMR;
than the sequential mechanism. Reducing ￿k for any k increases the probability of the
number of potential entrants equalling k￿1, while correspondingly reducing the probability
of the number exceeding k ￿ 1: So if k ￿ 1 ￿ n*; this leaves the auction with the higher
EMR; since EMRA(j) ￿ EMRS(j) is decreasing.
If k ￿ 1 < n*, the e⁄ect of a reduction from ￿k to ￿0
k can be divided into three steps;
￿rst multiplying the probability of every possible number of potential entrants by the same
fraction, ￿0
k=￿k; second increasing the probability of each number of potential entrants less
than or equal to k￿1 back to its original level, and third increasing the probability of k￿1
potential entrants by multiplying it by (1￿￿0
k)=(1￿￿k): Clearly each step leaves the auction
62This comparison of EMRs does not depend on MRs increasing in values (or any other regularity
condition) since, if 0 or 1 bidder is above v* the mechanisms sell to the same person, and if 2 or more are
above v* the sequential mechanism sells to an average bidder above v* (who therefore on average has MR =
v* ￿see note 58) whilst the auction sells to the highest one above v*, who is therefore distributed above
another one who has a value above v* (and so on average has MR equal to that value above v* ￿see note
58).
63This result, also, does not depend on MRs increasing in values or any other regularity condition.
Conditional on the (r +1)st value exceeding all previous values, the EMR of the (r +1)st value equals the
highest previous value (see note 58), which in turn exceeds the MR of that value, which is the MR of the
previous winner. Moreover, conditional on the (r + 1)st value not exceeding all previous values, the EMR
of the sequential mechanism is unchanged by the (r + 1)st entrant.
35with the higher EMR: So for all k, reducing ￿k leaves the auction with the higher EMR;
and hence higher expected revenue.￿
Proof of Lemma 5: For ￿j = 1 8j, assume for contradiction that the sequential mecha-
nism has as many bidders as the auction in expectation. Then the distribution of highest
values in the sequential mechanism must stochastically dominate the distribution in the
auction, since entrants into the sequential mechanism win if and only if their values are v*
or more, while auction participants sometimes lose with values above v* and sometimes win
with values below v*. So since an additional bidder￿ s expected pro￿ts from entering the
sequential mechanism are zero when v*= VS; its expected pro￿ts from entering the auction
are positive, which is a contradiction. So the auction attracts more bidders in expectation.
Now, 8f￿jg1
j=1; the auction has more expected bidders attributable to potential bidder
k, for 2 ￿ k ￿ n* (since all these would participate in the auction and not all would
participate in the sequential mechanism) and the sequential mechanism has more expected
bidders attributable to potential bidder k, for any k > n*: So since the auction has more
expected bidders for ￿j = 1 8j, it also has more expected bidders if we reduce (by lowering
￿k) the number of expected bidders attributable to all potential bidders from the kth on.￿
Proof of Lemma 6:64 Recall that expected surplus for all buyers and the seller would
be una⁄ected if the number of potential entrants, k, were revealed in advance of the ￿rst
bidder￿ s entrance (see note 23). So consider the mechanisms with k revealed in advance.
Observe that conditional on actually entering a potential entrant￿ s expected surplus from
the sequential mechanism is independent of its position in the queue (if its value is less
than V s it wins whenever its value exceeds all other k ￿ 1 signals; otherwise it wins with
probability 1; and must pay the same that it would expect to pay if its value were V s and
it did not deter). So its expected share of surplus from the sequential mechanism equals the
fraction of expected actual entrants that it represents, just as in the auction. Clearly there
are fewer expected entrants in the sequential mechanism than the auction if k ￿ n* (because
all potential entrants then enter the auction) and, since the expected number of entrants
in the sequential mechanism is less than n* (since it is less than n* even if ￿j = 1 8j, by
Lemma 5), the same is true if k > n*. So because the ￿rst bidder always enters, it expects
a larger share of the buyers￿surplus in the sequential mechanism than in the auction for
any k; and therefore also on average.￿
64If ￿j = 1 8j, the result is trivially true using the argument in the text, but in general, surplus is skewed
towards the ￿rst bidder in the auction, as well as in the sequential mechanism.
36Densities of winner￿ s value for an Auction and Sequential Mechanism with
identical expected winning bids and identical expected winner￿ s values.
[Drawn for bidders￿values uniformly distributed on [0;1];
for the Auction, n*= 3; so expected winning bid = ￿5;
for the Sequential Mechanism we assume the same cuto⁄ (winning) bid, ￿5,
so with an in￿nite number of potential entrants,
the expected winner￿ s value = ￿75, in both cases.]
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